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Abstract. An abundance of statistical and scientific data exists in the
area of clinical and epidemiological studies. Much of this data is dis-
tributed across regional, national and international boundaries with dif-
ferent policies on access and usage, and a multitude of different schemata
for the data often complicated by the variety of supporting clinical cod-
ing schemes. This prevents the wide scale collation and analysis of such
data as is often needed to infer clinical outcomes and to determine the
often moderate effect of drugs. Through grid technologies it is possi-
ble to overcome the barriers introduced by distribution of heterogeneous
data and services. However reliability, dynamicity and fine-grained secu-
rity are essential in this domain, and are not typically offered by current
grids. The MRC funded VOTES project (Virtual Organisations for Trials
and Epidemiological Studies) has implemented a prototype infrastruc-
ture specifically designed to meet these challenges. This paper describes
this on-going implementation effort and the lessons learned in building
grid frameworks for and within a clinical environment.
1 Introduction
Evaluation of new drugs or treatments requires infrastructure support to allow
procedures to be validated and verifiable results to be achieved within reasonable
timescales. Rather than building bespoke infrastructures for each clinical trial
or observational study, it is far more efficient to develop a framework that can
be reused and applied across numerous studies. A key challenge in supporting
this is to efficiently and effectively harness the plethora of clinical data that
exists across regional, national and international boundaries for clinical trials
and unbiased evaluations of their outcome.
Such a framework places critical demands on the infrastructure. Three of
these which are the focus of this paper are: security in ensuring that the right
data sets are made available to the right people for the right purpose; reliabilityin
ensuring that a failure of any parts of the system does not automatically mean
that the rest of the system is unavailable; dynamicity where a multitude of
different clinical trials or observational studies can be rapidly supported where
different clinical data sets with different security policies and different users can
be brought together for the conduct of a given trial or study. This paper outlines
how the Medical Research Council funded Virtual Organisations for Trials and
Epidemiological Studies (VOTES) project has developed an infrastructure that
supports such capabilities.
2 Infrastructure Requirements for Clinical Trials
From a data perspective, the inherent challenge is in building an Information
Grid [1] matching data across domain boundaries and understanding the re-
lationships between differing classification and indexing systems (if such rela-
tionships actually exist). This should support the overall processes involved in
establishing and managing a clinical trial including patient recruitment, data col-
lection throughout the trial and overall trial management. Once these data sets
are federated they can then be presented under a single global schema description
and have distributed, federated queries executed upon them as one ostensibly
unified resource. Data is only one aspect of such a framework and a fundamental
necessity is to provide a security infrastructure where cross-institutional policies
on data access and usage can be agreed upon, and visibly enforced to the satis-
faction of all data providers, data owners, infrastructure administrators, ethical
and legal advisees and the numerous other actors that play a significant and
important role in clinical trials.
Clinical trials and studies are driven by statistics. Understanding the often
moderate impacts of drugs often requires significant numbers of people to be
involved in a study. This level of scale necessitates an infrastructure capable
of handling large volumes of data. As an example, the UK Biobank [2] will be
gathering information on 500,000 participants aged between 40 and 69. A grid
framework provides one infrastructure capable of dealing with such volumes.
A major requirement of an infrastructure built to support this kind of initia-
tive is that of reliability. A simple definition of this can be expressed as: Can a
user depend on the software and system behaving in a manner that they expect?
[3]? Hence the users of a service provisioned by this technology must have a
guarantee that it will function and behave as they expect it to. For any pro-
duction system, this guarantee, also known as an acceptable quality of service
(QoS), can only be provided if the system can be described as:
– Reliable protected against system damage, interruption, resource scarcity
or degradation.
– Secure protected against hostile action by a malicious third party.
– Scaleable able to function smoothly and without incident, despite simulta-
neous access by large numbers of users.
– Dynamic able to function smoothly despite being run across heterogeneous
environments, with differing policies governing access and use.
Only if all four of these items are sufficiently addressed, can the end-users be
confident that the system will behave in a predictable manner as described by
the service providers.
3 Clinical Virtual Organisations
The concept of a Virtual Organisation (VO) is one that is central to Grid com-
puting. A VO is defined as a collection of resources shared in a coordinated and
dynamic, yet highly-controlled manner, in pursuit of a common goal [4]. There
are several features that are common to most VOs:
– The need for a common security policy, with a well understood degree of
trust between participating parties and resources.
– Sharing of data, storage and processing power within the VO for the achieve-
ment and common good of the VO according to VO policies.
– Acknowledgement of the transient lifetime of the VO.
Grids involved in the clinical domain are primarily concerned with information
and information flows. VOs in this field impose additional requirements uncom-
mon to VOs in other domains due to the strict security requirements which have
to be directly and explicitly upheld. As such, the term Clinical Virtual Organisa-
tion (CVO) is used here, to distinguish these groupings from the more common
definition of a Virtual Organisation.
The most immediate consequences of this information-centric nature are
grounded in security. Issues such as the anonymisation of data and the abil-
ity to statistically infer identifying data must be considered, and implemented
with the utmost regard for data privacy and integrity, given the potentially
high sensitivity of the data involved. Additionally, the lack of unification in the
distributed format of clinical information is another challenging and distinctive
feature of this domain and the associated CVOs.
There has been much work investigating the methods of applying security to
VOs, with particularly relevant sources being the DyVOSE [5] and the GOLD
[6] projects. There are also a number of initiatives that attempt to set up VOs
specifically for the life sciences domain, with characteristics similar to the CVOs
described above [7] [8] [9].
3.1 Trial data across domains
There are many challenges involved with implementing the different aspects
of CVOs. Two major issues relating to heterogeneous data federation must be
overcome before the concept can become a reality:
– The lack of a unified data structure to represent common clinical concepts
and classifications.
– The lack of an index to match unique individual records on either side of a
domain boundary with each other.
Several solutions to these problems have been proposed. Health-Level 7 (HL7)
[10] has been mooted as a possible global schema by which all clinical data refers
to a common global standard. This solution is attractive in that the problems as-
sociated with heterogeneous environments would be greatly reduced if this stan-
dard was widely adopted. However, to date, it has not had widespread/universal
uptake. HL7 is also a highly centralised solution, which diverges from the ideal
grid scenario of equally dispensable, contributing nodes providing the overall
functionality of a system.
A proposition that provides a more grid-like solution is to have a peer-to-peer
matching of local datasets, where brokers governing inter-domain communica-
tions only have knowledge of the schemas belonging to the various other brokers
that they encounter. In this way, a knowledge base of local schema could be
built up that would be comprehensive for the immediate environment, but was
not unnecessarily burdened with knowledge of data structures that it does not
require.
However it is implemented, a reliable infrastructure must exist on either side
of a domain boundary that supports the mechanism to federate the data. That
infrastructure must have a certain amount of knowledge of the schema beyond
that boundary, and must be relied upon to effectively implement the federation
service.
3.2 De-centralisation of components
The first line of defence in protecting a system against non-hostile malfunctions
is to replicate critical system components across several machines and imple-
ment application code that automatically tests for, and subsequently uses, live
components within this network.
As long as it is efficiently implemented, this architecture allows for system
damage, network interruptions and power failures, ideally with no noticeable
detriment to the overall quality of service provided to the end user. It should
be noted here that such concepts are not new and are implemented as best
practices in most current production IT systems. The clinical domain imposes
certain other requirements however in ensuring the robustness and tolerance
of replicated components. Compromises of any given components should not
compromise all nodes in the system where those components have been replicated
for example. This is especially important for multi-institutional scenarios where
code is replicated.
In terms of grid technology, the emphasis is upon how these networked backup
systems relate to each other within the CVO. Again, two solutions are immedi-
ately apparent:
– Have each node mirror each other in terms of backup architecture. This is a
static solution and runs the risk of having many unused resources.
– Have a notification system within the CVO that updates each node with
the set-up necessary for effective production use at any given time. This
requires more sophisticated application code to be implemented, but ulti-
mately makes more efficient use of the distributed and disparate resources.
3.3 Dynamic resource allocation
Another aspect that grid technology adds to the established concepts of system
reliability is the need for a dynamic and flexible solution. Within a CVO, re-
sources may not be available, not just as a result of malfunctions, but also as
a result of restrictions implemented by a local resource administrator, possibly
limiting the resource availability to the rest of the CVO.
However, to implement this aspect effectively, an over-riding static context
is required within which dynamic resource allocation can then occur. This static
context would most likely take the form of a pre-defined legal agreement between
the participating nodes of the CVO.
The mechanics of dynamically allocating resources would require the ability
to poll and monitor the availability of resources within the CVO. An initial static
list of potential resources would then be available to each node, and the use of
those resources would be dependent on the immediate results of the polling.
A foreseeable extension to this system would be the ability for the application
to automatically assess the load in a given area of the CVO and re-distribute it for
optimal overall performance. Such resource broking and information services are
common to grids in other less security focused domains, yet largely uncommon
in the clinical domain where resources typically are not advertised.
4 VOTES Project Overview
The VOTES project (Virtual Organisations for Trials and Epidemiological Stud-
ies) [11] is a 3-year, 2.8 million project funded by the UK Medical Research
Council, and is specifically detailed to investigate and address these large-scale
clinical challenges using grid technology. The VOTES project itself is a collab-
oration between the universities of Glasgow, Oxford, Imperial College London,
Leicester, Nottingham and Manchester.
The alpha and beta prototype applications that have been developed so far
provide a portal gateway to clinical data distributed across several representa-
tive test databases to form a data federation system [12], by use of distributed
grid and data services. The software used is a combination of GridSphere [13],
Globus Toolkit v4 [14] and OGSA-DAI [15]. The clinical databases contain real-
istic clinical data that accurately represent the clinical datasets and associated
software in current use in the Scottish National Health Service (SCI Store [16],
GPASS [17], SMR [18]) with on-going negotiations for access to live clinical data.
4.1 VOTES architecture
In terms of critical component services, the architecture of a single node in
the CVO is shown in Figure 1. This architecture has been implemented and is
available for testing at [19].
A portal connects to a grid server, which in turn connects to a data server,
a driving database (a database through which the distributed SQL is submitted
to the pool), and finally several auxiliary databases from which the clinical data
is retrieved. The modular design allows components to be inserted and removed
easily. The interface to allow for future expansion occurs at the data server,
where it is envisioned that the node will connect to other nodes in the CVO
Fig. 1. Glasgow CVO node architecture
(at the other university partner sites and clinical data centres in the NHS for
example). Trust policies represented as CVO database rules on legal (authorised)
connections are used to ensure that only authorised people can issue queries and
importantly that those queries adhere to the agreed contracts between the data
providers and data owners to the different roles associated with a clinical trial,
e.g. investigators, nurses etc.
To illustrate the reliability factoring of the current set-up, Figure 2 shows
the system in terms of real machines at NeSC Glasgow.
With the knowledge of the systems modus operandi from Figure 1, Figure 2
shows the possible paths of operation between the different components and
their duplicates on the Glasgow node of the CVO. In order for this architecture
to operate effectively it is necessary to implement application code that will, in
the first instance, test the live-ness of a preferred component and only attempt
subsequent code execution if that test comes back positive, i.e. the component
is available.
If the test is negative then the code must move on to the next assigned re-
source that provides this component, where it will attempt the same test. Only
once all the available resources have been tested and no positives have been
returned will the system report to the operator that it has failed and cannot
proceed with execution. The code that implements this test in VOTES is as
follows for the grid and data servers:
String service = http://serviceIP/GridOrDataService;
URL url = new URL(service);
URLConnection dc = url.openConnection();
A simple Java URL object is created from the given (standard) URI of the
grid or data service. A connection is opened to this service, and a handshake
is initiated to establish that the URL is valid and accepting connections. The
Fig. 2. Actual architecture showing support for reliability at NeSC Glasgow. Note the
use of Shibboleth technology to protect the portal access on labpc-2.
code for testing the various databases - CVO, driving and auxiliary - uses (again
standard) JDBC connection techniques:
String url = jdbc:dbType:dbIP/dbName;
Class.forName(driver);
Connection conn = DriverManager.getConnection(url,username,password);
conn.close();
The JDBC URL is constructed, the driver for the particular database type is
referenced and a connection is opened with the relevant username and password.
(These objects are all included in the standard Java SQL packages.) Once the
connection has been successfully opened, it is immediately closed again.
It should be noted that in terms of service provision, the auxiliary databases
are termed as such because they are not critical to the overall operation of
the entire system. However they do provide the raison d’etre of the system the
clinical data. If an auxiliary database fails then no change occurs in the operation
of the VOTES system, but the data housed on that machine will not be available.
Because of this, though they are technically not critical components for the
smooth operation of the service, the auxiliary databases must be maintained
with equal rigour as the rest of the infrastructure.
It is envisioned that in the pre-defined static agreement, a responsibility for
node maintenance would be detailed and within this, a hierarchy between critical
and non-critical components would be established. Also, any changes to the local
administration of username/password accounts, and their communication to the
rest of the CVO, would have to be outlined in this agreement as well, with
the possibility of dynamic tools to automate this procedure being a possible
enhancement to the framework tools.
4.2 Implications of architecture
Several implications arise from the application code that has been implemented
so far:
Security In order for the connections to succeed the relevant ports must be
opened between the portal server and the other machine, which provides a po-
tential security hole. The risk is mitigated somewhat if both server processes are
in the same node, by the fact that the communication is between two trusted
machines. But if it is a communication between machines that only trust each
other to a limited degree, such as between two CVO nodes, the situation is more
complicated, and would likely be referred back to the terms of the over-riding
static agreement.
Distribution The code above requires specific Java driver libraries to be dis-
tributed within the portal server to allow connections to the different types of
databases. The main issue here is anticipating the various database types that
will be used in the clinical domain. Again, this could be addressed by defining
in the initial agreement a set of databases that would be used for implementa-
tion within the CVO. A study of the most popular and widely adopted clinical
databases would provide a useful idea of what these would be.
Distribution with this knowledge would be less problematic as the pre-requisite
drivers would be bundled with the VOTES software package. However, the le-
gal terms of re-distribution of these drivers would also need to be addressed
beforehand.
Performance The performance reduction with the added connection code is
significant, as establishing one connection with a server or database takes a non-
trivial amount of time. This is the area that must be addressed most effectively,
as any grid solution must be scaleable to very large numbers, with a minimal
reduction of performance.
A possible solution here would be to establish only connections with a subset
of the resources available, then record in a central list, available to the rest
of the CVO, the fact that a particular server or database is recorded as live.
However, this would also reduce performance through an increase in network
traffic. Additionally the dynamic element would be lost, as connectivity testing
necessarily occurs in real-time between primary sources.
As is evident from the discussion of these three areas, the system described
still has issues that must be solved in order for it to be widely accepted as a grid
solution. We note that the VOTES project began in October 2005 and is funded
for three years - hence it is natural that prototypes explore the problem space
to discover issues in rolling out grid infrastructures in this domain.
4.3 Administration
Administration of clinical trials by means of the portal is another major issue
that must be addressed when designing a re-usable framework that will effec-
tively utilise grid technology. This is particularly pertinent to the process of
patient recruitment where several actors of varying privileges must co-ordinate
the details of a trial, which themselves will change over the trials lifetime.
The current VOTES implementation has several trials that provide test data
to explore the various issues described above. However the next stage of devel-
opment is to provide a separate administrative portal that will allow such trial
coordination to occur on a CVO-wide basis.
The process we envisage is where a privileged user, likely the trial investi-
gator, needs to create a trial and select from a list of available databases the
information to be queried for this particular scenario. The databases will have a
live schema querying and description service that will allow the investigator to
browse the available information and discover the necessary resources.
From this, the investigator will then be able to assign access rights to specific
roles within that trial and the CVO, thus populating data in the authorization
access matrix (see next section). Due to the necessarily transient nature of CVOs,
a time-limit on these access privileges will also be set at this point. This process
would involve the trial investigator completing the following steps:
– Trial creation
– Selection of databases from those available in the CVO (using a descriptive
browsing tool)
– View parameters/schemas within these databases and their descriptions
– Select parameters/schema elements relevant to this trial
– Define the roles to be used in this trial
– List the parameter/schema elements that each role can view
– Distribute these roles to known and trusted users
A complication here is the fact that a trial could be created with only a lim-
ited set of data shown from other data providers that do not necessarily trust
the primary investigator of the trial. This type of privilege allocation would be
referred to the overall static agreement and would necessitate a super-user that
could monitor and arbitrate data sharing issues throughout the CVO. Another
way of considering this is the trial investigator creating a trial will be the most
privileged user, and can only issue roles and access to data sets that are within
their level of privilege. It might well be the case however that the clinical data
sets and schemas will be potentially far more extensive than a given trial inves-
tigator is permitted to see and allocate. This administrative portal has yet to be
implemented.
5 Security Considerations
The main focus of this paper so far has been on the provision of a reliable service,
which behaves in a stable and predictable manner by overcoming the challenges
of non-hostile interruptions. However, a consideration that is of equal, if not
greater, import is the protection against unpredictability due to disruption of
hostile intent. Not only must the system be able to maintain an acceptable QoS
but due to the potentially high sensitivity of the data involved, must have a
rigorous security policy, which is adhered to in the strictest terms possible.
Grid security is often expressed in terms of AAA:
– Authentication the ability for a user to verify their identity to a resource.
– Authorization the ability to assign privilege to a user on a particular re-
source, once their identity has been positively established.
– Accounting the ability to unambiguously assign actions to users to allow
non-repudiation in the event of a security breach.
In current grid technologies, the predominant method for enforcing authenti-
cation is to use the well-established technology of Public Key Infrastructures
(PKIs) [20]. Authorization is an area that requires more sophisticated controls
and therefore requires more research to give the necessary flexible and secure ac-
cess control. Applications such as PERMIS [21] and VOMS [22] have been used
in different contexts to research this area, making use of underlying paradigms
such as role-based access control within a Privilege Management Infrastructure
(PMI c.f. PKI) [23], or privilege delegation within a Virtual Organisations. No
single authorization technology has yet been established as providing all the
solutions for access control on the Grid.
In the current VOTES prototype, authentication is achieved through a user-
name/password combination at the portal to the CVO, and with a second au-
thentication step between the grid/data servers and the local database resources.
A successful experimentation in this regard was to add Shibboleth [24] technol-
ogy to this gateway, to allow a once-only authentication step to a Shibboleth
federation [25]. This step also allows users to be mapped to roles within the
portal, thereby de-coupling the users identity from the rest of the operation pro-
cess, and thus making the system more maintainable. An extension to this is
likely to be the use of PKI and digital certificates to verify the identity of users.
Information on the application of Shibboleth in this domain is given in [26].
Authorization is achieved by enforcing role-based access at the CVO level.
A database server is run at each node, known as the CVO Database which
maintains a mapping between roles and privileges (the roles having been assigned
in the previous step). Based on these roles, the user can see a specific view of
the data, depending on their level of privilege. Figures 3 and 4 show screen shots
of the different parameters that an investigator role can see, and those that a
nurse can see. Note that the nurse view is limited to non-identifying data.
This differentiation between roles is achieved using an Access Matrix model
in the CVO database applied to roles within the CVO for a given trial. The
Fig. 3. The parameters shown are those that can be queried by the investigator role.
Critically they allow identification of patients where those available to the nurse do
not.
Fig. 4. The parameters shown are those that can be queried by the nurse role.
model is best represented using mathematical matrices of parameter versus role-
name with a bitwise representation of access privilege (i.e. if a 1 is present in the
value of an element in the matrix where a specific parameter meets a role-name,
then that role has access to that parameter).
However the practical implementation of this matrix is most efficiently achieved
using a database schema that holds information about trials, participating databases
and their parameters. Figure 5 shows the Entity-Relationship diagram for this
CVO database roles are defined in the context of specific trials, parameters
belong to specific databases and the access privilege information is obtained by
a view that matches the roles to the parameters through the primary tables.
Previous work researching the application of access controls to data federation
systems can be found at [27] and [28].
Fig. 5. ER diagram of CVO database
Accounting is an aspect that is usually implemented later in grid application
development, as it is a secondary method of protection attempting to assert
accountability after an incident has occurred. A rudimentary accounting mech-
anism has been implemented in the VOTES portal, maintaining the number
and nature of the queries executed through the portal. A necessary extension to
this will be the assignation of identity to the queries executed, using the digital
certificates from the initial authentication step.
In addition to the common concerns of grid security, as has been mentioned
when defining the CVO, are issues that relate directly to the process of infor-
mation sharing in the clinical domain:
– Anonymisation the ability to identify records as unique entities but whilst
still protecting the individual identity of the patient that the record pertains
to.
– Statistical Inference the ability to prevent identification of individuals by
combining two or more sets of non-identifying criteria to a query (e.g. a
patient suffering from an unusual condition in a particular postcode).
A possible solution to these problems is the use of encrypting technology, such as
PKI, and using an anonymisation service within the CVO, with a trust hierarchy
that is analogous to the use of certificate authorities in PKIs. Non-disclosure of
any result sets when only a certain number of records are returned is a common
mechanism used to prevent potentially identifying data. More in-depth discus-
sion of these issues can be found in [29] and [30].
Finally, the issue of patient consent is one that has direct implications on the
security and reliability of such a system. In any initiative that involves such sensi-
tive data, consent must be obtained from the patients about whom it concerns.
This necessitates a point in the process that cannot under any circumstances
be automated: where a patient must register with the appropriate authority
that they give unambiguous consent to use a specific piece of their clinical data
records.
In terms of security and reliability, the interface that the patient uses must
therefore be user-friendly, securely implemented and protected against non-
hostile interruption. To encourage uptake and confidence in the system, partici-
pants must feel that the infrastructure, into which these highly personal details
are being input, is secure and reliable. Public understanding of the purpose,
benefits, and potential drawbacks and dangers of clinical trials along with the
non-technical information on how their data will be used is essential and is cur-
rently being explored in detail in several large scale projects across Scotland
[31].
6 Conclusion
A reliable system that behaves in a predictable and secure manner is absolutely
mandatory for any production enterprise to gain widespread acceptance this is
especially so in the clinical domain. There are many solutions already in current
IT practice that attempt to mitigate the risks posed by service interruptions
of hostile or non-hostile intent, however with the move towards large scale in-
ternational trials, open architecture based approaches are becoming ever more
necessary. The additional challenges posed in using grid infrastructures are the
need for flexibility and scalability, whilst still maintaining these rigorous levels
of reliability and security.
While technology is fundamental to achieving this vision, arguably the great-
est hurdle to be overcome is the human factor. With the implementation of grid
applications across heterogeneous domains of differing structures and policies,
the need for greater communication between parties and the absolute delineation
of duties and responsibilities in a legal context is mandatory for progress to be
achieved. Ultimately large scale infrastructures in the clinical domain depend
upon trust: trust of people, trust of software and trust of practices.
The VOTES project has engineered a secure and robust grid infrastructure
prototype. However, this is still very much a work in progress with new clinical
requirements and new data sets arising, combined with changes in the grid tech-
nology and standards landscape. In time, the development of this infrastructure
will hopefully meet the challenges outlined and be adopted on a global scale and
help drive wider grid efforts in this domain.
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